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GUILT, INNOCENCE, AND FEDERALISM
IN HABEAS CORPUS
Of all the many dark corners of the law, few are so dimly
lit as is the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction under which fed-
eral courts pass upon the constitutional validity of state criminal
prosecutions. Here many important developments are occur-
ring, with all the hazards of walking in the dark.
J -Professor Curtis Reitz
In 1979, the Supreme Court held in Jackson v. Virginia2 that
a state prisoner who claimed that his conviction was supported by
insufficient evidence could petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The Court regarded this conclusion as a corollary to In re Win-
ship,3 in which it held that the Constitution requires the state to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 4  But Jackson signifies a
real shift in the Court's view of the role of habeas corpus giving
special protection to rights related to guilt or innocence. This
Note questions the wisdom of such a shift, and after considering
the desirability of hinting the habeas corpus remedy at all,
suggests an alternative approach to habeas corpus relief.
I
HISTORY
A. Development of the Habeas Corpus Remedy
The Judiciary Act of 1789 5 empowered federal courts to
issue the writ of habeas corpus; as it existed at common law, to
federal prisoners. 6  Since 1867, when Congress extended habeas
corpus jurisdiction to state prisoners,7 the Great Writ 8 has become
I Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for State Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L.
REV. 461, 461 (1960) (footnote omitted).
2 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
3 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
4 Id. at 364.
Ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
6 Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 201-02 (1830). For a discussion of the early
history of the writ, see Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV.
1038, 1042-45 (1970). Compare Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399-405 (1963) (Brennan, J.)
(writ was originally broad in scope) with Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-Habeas Cor-
pus, 64 MICH. L. REv. 451, 458-61 (1966) (writ was originally narrow in scope).
7 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(1976)).
8 See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399 (1963); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO
& H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYS-
TEM 1426 (2d ed. 1973).
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"an untidy area of law;" 9 both courts and scholars" ° have taken
conflicting views about the role of habeas corpus review. Despite
the debate over the theoretical underpinnings of collateral review,
courts have defined its availability with more clarity.
Early courts limited the availability of the writ to prisoners
who alleged that the trial court lacked proper jurisdiction."i But
the Supreme Court soon expanded the definition of "jurisdic-
tional" error and thereby increased the availability of the writ.
12
Eventually only strained distinctions kept cases within the jurisdic-
tion requirement,' 3 and in Waley v. Johnston 14 and Brown v. Al-
len, 5 the Court finally abandoned it.
9 Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 184 (1947) (dissenting opinion, Frankfurter, J.).
10 Compare Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76
HARV. L. REV. 441, 488-89 (1963) (finding Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1973), consis-
tent with Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915)) with Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact
of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1315, 1329 (1961) and Hart, The Supreme
Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 105 (1959)
(Moore overruled Frank).
" Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202 (1830). This limitation continued after
Congress extended the writ to protect state prisoners. See, e.g., In re Moran, 203 U.S. 97,
105 (1906) (denying federal prisoner relief although conviction allegedly violated fifth
amendment); In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891) (denying state prisoner relief on claim of
discriminatory selection of grand and petit jurors).
12 During the nineteenth century, the expansion was so gradual that the Court may not
have realized what it was doing. By 1900, the court had held that habeas corpus is proper
when contemporaneous punishments are imposed for the same offense (Ex parte Lange, 85
U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873)); when consecutive sentences are imposed for one offense (In re
Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889); In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274 (1887)); for convictions without
prior grand jury indictments (Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885)); and for convictions
under unconstitutional statutes (Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879)). However, the Court
still considered the jurisdiction requirement meaningful. Professor Bator explains that the
justices "plainly did not feel that their distinctions were verbal fictions under the cover of
which they could produce ... an expansion [of the habeas corpus jurisdiction]." Bator,
supra note 10, at 472.
"S The decline of the jurisdiction requirement accelerated with the apparently con-
tradictory cases of Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915), and Moore v. Dempsey, 261
U.S. 86 (1923). Frank held that a federal court could not grant habeas corpus relief where
it would disturb a state determination that a trial was not influenced by organized crime;
Moore approved habeas corpus review of such a state determination. Although commen-
tators dispute the consistency of Moore and Frank, see note 10 supra, the decisions certainly
highlight the fine Court-drawn distinctions between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional er-
rors. Lange also displays the subtlety of the distinction. "A judgment may be erroneous and
not void, and it may be erroneous because it is void. The distinctions ... are very nice .... "
Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 175 (1873). After Moore the Court loosened the
jurisdictional requirement even further. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)
(holding trial court lacked jurisdiction where defendant was unconstitutionally deprived of
counsel).
14 316 U.S. 101 (1942). The Court extended habeas corpus to cases where jurisdiction
was valid but where "the conviction has been in disregard of the constitutional rights of the
accused, and where the writ is the only effective means of preserving his rights." Id. at 105.
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After Brown, only a procedural barrier to habeas corpus re-
lief remained; courts would not provide collateral relief unless a
prisoner had exhausted all available state remedies. 16 This limita-
tion remained in force until 1963, when the Court, in Fay v.
Noia, 17 approved habeas corpus relief for a prisoner who had not
appealed his case at the state level. This expansion of habeas cor-
pus relief provided the jurisdictional basis for many of the War-
ren Court's landmark constitutional decisions.
1 8
The Court did not cut back on the scope of habeas corpus
review until 1976. In Stone v. Powell,1 9 two petitioners alleged that
the prosecution had obtained important evidence through uncon-
stitutional searches. Balancing the policies behind the exclusionary
rule against interests in efficiency and state sovereignty, the Court
held that search and seizure claims are not subject to collateral
attack if the prisoner has an opportunity for full and fair review
at the state level."0 In a telling footnote, it characterized habeas
corpus as a "safeguard against compelling an innocent man to
suffer an unconstitutional loss of liberty."2
B. Evidentiary Sufficiency, the Reasonable Doubt Standard, and Habeas
Corpus
Traditionally, allegations of insufficient evidence did not
raise a cognizable habeas corpus issue. In 1960, the Supreme
Court created an- exception to this rule. In Thompson v. City of
Louisville,22 a state court had convicted petitioner of loitering and
disorderly conduct. On habeas corpus review, the Supreme Court
found the record "entirely lacking in evidence" 23 to support con-
Although Waley expanded habeas corpus considerably, it still limited the writ to cases
where state corrective processes were inadequate, leaving habeas as the "only effective"
remedy. See Bator, supra note 10, at 493-99.
15 344 U.S. 443 (1953). Brown rejected the sole vestige of the jurisdictional requirement
surviving Waley. See note 14 supra. The Court exercised habeas jurisdiction to review a jury
discrimination claim although state courts had fully examined the issue. The Court later
said that Brown symbolized a "manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of
personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal
judicial review." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424 (1963).
16 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 482-87 (1953).
.7 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
18 See Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE
L.J. 1035, 1041-44 (1977).
19 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
20 Id. at 481-82.
21 Id. at 491-92 n.31.
22 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
23 Id. at 204.
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viction under the applicable city ordinances, and reversed the
conviction. 4
The Thompson court did not explicitly limit federal habeas
corpus review of evidentiary sufficiency claims. Noting that its de-
cision turned "not on the sufficiency of the evidence, but on
whether this conviction rest[ed] upon any evidence at all," 25 the
Court held that "it [is] a violation of due process to... punish a man
without evidence of his guilt." 26 This doctrine was rooted in the
notion that deference to state courts is unnecessary if a conviction
is contrary to fundamental fairness, 27 "the whole proceeding is a
mask," 28 or no evidence supports a civil punishment.
29
Although the Court failed to define the scope of this new
doctrine,3 ° it subsequently relied on Thompson not only to issue
writs of habeas corpus on claims of "no evidence," 31 but also to
deny relief when the petitioner alleged only that insufficient evi-
dence supported his conviction. 2 The writ was available only if
the record was "totally devoid" of evidence of guilt.
33
24 The trial court found that Thompson was dancing alone to jukebox music in a cafe,
that the manager of the cafe denied selling him anything to eat, that the petitioner told the
arresting officers he was waiting for a bus, and that he argued with the officers when they
tried to arrest him. Id. at 199-200.
These evidentiary findings are interesting because presence in a cafe is surely evi-
dence of loitering, just as arguing with police is some evidence of disorderly conduct. Com-
mentators criticized the decision, accusing the Court of redefining the evidence necessary
to convict under a local statute rather than finding the record devoid of evidence. See, e.g.,
Note, No Evidence to Support a Conviction -The Supreme Court's Decisions in Thompson v. City
of Louisville and Garner v. Louisiana, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1137, 1140-42 (1962).
-5 362 U.S. at 199.
26 Id. at 206.
27 See Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 402 (1945).
28 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923).
29 See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 246-47 (1957) (denial of due
process for state to prevent applicant from taking bar exam when record lacks evidence of
bad character); United States ex reL Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U.S. 103, 106 (1927)
("Deportation ... on charges unsupported by any evidence is a denial of due process which
may be corrected on habeas corpus.") (sufficient evidence found).
30 Debate over the meaning of Thompson continued until Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307 (1979). See, e.g., Speigner v. Jago, 603 F.2d 1208, 1211, 1216-17 (6th Cir. 1979) (debat-
ing whether Thompson necessarily incorporated a sufficiency standard or whether the words
"no evidence" should be read literally).
31 See, e.g., Johnson v. Florida, 391 U.S. 596 (1968) (vagrancy); Garner v. Louisiana,
368 U.S. 157 (1961) (disturbing the peace; Negroes taking seats at white lunch counter).
32 See, e.g., Cunha v. Brewer, 511 F.2d 894, 898 (8th Cir. 1975); Faust v. North
Carolina, 307 F.2d 869, 872 (4th cir. 1962); cert. denied, 371 U.S. 964 (1963).
22 The Fourth Circuit explained:
There is a difference between a conviction based upon evidence deemed insuf-
ficient as a matter of state criminal law and one so totally devoid of evidentiary
support as to raise a due process issue. It is only in the latter situation that
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In In re Winship,34 a case that did not involve habeas corpus,
the Court held that the due process clause required proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. In Winship, a state family court had
adjudged a juvenile "delinquent" 35 by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. Noting that "[the reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital
role in the American scheme of criminal procedure," 36 the Sup-
reme Court reversed, holding that the state conviction violated the
due process clause:
Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional sta-
ture of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that
the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."
Arguably, this language encompasses claims of evidentiary
insufficiency in habeas corpus cases, but courts did not im-
mediately construe Winship to affect the Thompson "no evidence"
standard. Federal courts continued to follow the "well-
established" 38 doctrine that a cognizable federal habeas corpus
claim must allege a total lack of evidence supporting the convic-
tion. 39  Lower courts, however, immediately recognized Winship's
importance in other contexts of criminal law. State statutes that
required a defendant to disprove an element of the crime suc-
cumbed to the new doctrine, 40 and convictions based on improper
jury instructions regarding the reasonable doubt standard were
set aside.41
there has been a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, affording the state
prisoner a remedy in a federal court on a writ of habeas corpus.
Faust v. North Carolina, 307 F.2d 869, 872 (4th Cir. 1962) (citation omitted), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 964 (1963).
34 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
" The state statute defined a juvenile delinquent as "a person over seven and less than
sixteen years of age who does any act which, if done by an adult, would constitute a
crime." N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 712 (McKinney 1975) (amended 1978).
36 397 U.S. at 363.
37 Id. at 364.
3' United States ex rel. Johnson v. Illinois, 469 F.2d 1297, 1300 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 920 (1973).
" See, e.g., Brooks v. Rose, 520 F.2d 775, 777 (6th Cir. 1975); Robinson v. Wolff, 468
F.2d 438, 440 (8th Cir. 1972); United States ex rel. Johnson v. Illinois, 469 F.2d 1297, 1300
(7th Cir. 1972), cert. deniid, 411 U.S. 920 (1973).
40 Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). Cf Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197
(1977) (no violation of Winship to shift burden of proving emotional disturbance to defen-
dant when not an element of crime).
" Cf Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100 (1972) (per curium) (due process denied
where jury instructed to ignore defense testimony unless it believed beyond a reasonable
doubt testimony was true).
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No court perceived the relationship between Thompson and
Winship until 1977. In Freeman v. Zahradnick,4 2 the petitioner was con-
victed of possessing a shotgun found in the trunk of a car in
which he had been riding. Because the record contained some evi-
dence of possession, a federal court refused to grant a writ of
habeas corpus.4 3 Justice Stewart dissented from the Court's de-
nial of certiorari, arguing that Winship may require a different
standard for challenges to evidentiary sufficiency:
If, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the state, . . . a federal court determines that no rational trier of
fact could have found a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
the state offense with which he was charged, it is surely argu-
able that the court must hold, under Winship, that the convicted
defendant was denied due process of law."
II
A NEW DIRECTION
A. Jackson v. Virginia4 -
A Virginia county judge convicted James Jackson of first-
degree murder for the shooting death of Mary Houston Cole, a
prison employee who had befriended Jackson while he was in-
carcerated for another offense. Although even the prosecutor ap-
parently did not believe that the evidence supported a finding of
premeditation, 46 the trial judge did, and sentenced Jackson to
thirty years imprisonment.47
After an unsuccessful state appeal, 48 Jackson petitioned a
federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the
evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. 49  The court
42 429 U.S. 1111 (1977), denying cert. to Freeman v. Slayton, 550 F.2d 909 (4th Cir.
1976) (district court opinion unreported).
43 429 U.S. 1111 (1977).
44 Id. at 1112-13 (emphasis added).
45 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
46 Brief for Petitioner at 7, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Jackson admitted
shooting the victim, but claimed he did so without premeditation or specific intent, neces-
sary elements of first-degree murder in Virginia. See VA. CODE § 18.2-32 (1975). He ar-
gued that the killing was accidental, and, alternatively, that he 1 as too intoxicated at the
time of the killing to formulate the specific intent necessary to sustain a conviction under
Virginia law. 443 U.S. at 311.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 312.
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apparently found that no evidence supported the conviction, and
issued the writ under the Thompson standard. 50  The Fourth Cir-
cuit reversed, finding some evidence of premeditation. 5' The
court noted that Winship might warrant a different standard,52 but
applied the "no evidence" standard in the absence of further gui-
dance from the Supreme Court.53
The Supreme Court shortly provided that guidance. In
Jackson,54 the Court held that the Thompson standard failed to pro-
tect the constitutional rights established by Winship.5 5  The two
cases were based on different rights: Thompson on "freedom from
a wholly arbitrary deprivation of liberty," 56 and Winship on the
right to acquittal if guilt is not proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.57  The Court held that because Winship extended beyond
Thompson, the "trial ritual" 58 of instructing the jury on the reason-
able doubt standard was insufficient: "[a] properly instructed jury
may occasionally convict even when it can be said that no rational
trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
same may be said of a trial judge sitting as jury." 59  Instead, the
Court interpreted Winship to require federal courts to examine
the facts of each case: 60
After Winship the critical inquiry on review of the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must be
not simply to determine whether the jury was properly in-
structed, but to determine whether the record evidence could
reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.6'
Because only this standard would "guarantee the fundamental
protection of due process of law," 62 the Court considered a chal-
50 Id. (district court opinion unreported).
51 Id. at 312 (circuit court opinion unreported).
52 Id. The court cited Justice Stewart's dissent from the denial of certiorari in Freeman
v. Zahradnick, 429 U.S. 1111 (1977). See notes 42-44 and accompanying text supra.
53 443 U.S. at 312.
54 Justice Stewart, author of the Freeman dissent, wrote the majority opinion inJackson.
55 443 U.S. at 313-16.
56 Id. at 314.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 316-17.
59 Id. at 317.
60 Id. at 318.
61 Id. (footnote omitted).
62 Id. at 319.
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lenge to evidentiary sufficiency a constitutional claim cognizable
on habeas corpus.6"
The Court rejected several objections to the new standard.
First, it dismissed concerns about federal intrusion into state crim-
inal trials, reasoning that "[c]ourts can and regularly do gauge the
sufficiency of the evidence without intruding into any legitimate
domain of the trier of fact .... ,"64 Similarly, the Court regarded
fears of additional burdens on the judiciary as "exaggerated." 65
Federal courts had been hearing sufficiency claims since
Thompson,66 and the new standard would merely expand an exist-
ing class of habeas claims. The Court also dismissed "problems of
finalty and federal-state comity," because they "arise whenever a
state prisoner invokes the jurisdiction of a federal court to redress
an alleged constitutional violation." 67 Finally, the Court rejected
the state's argument, based on Stone v. Powell, 68 that habeas corpus
review should be unavailable to state prisoners who have received
a "full and fair hearing" in the state system, 69 noting that Con-
gress empowered federal courts to ensure that state determina-
tions are "in accord with federal constitutional law." 70 Secure in
its formulation, the court focused on the facts of the case before
it, found the conviction to be supported by sufficient evidence,
and denied the writ.
7 1
In re Winship 72 does not compel the Court's result in
Jackson.73  Winship is ambiguous, containing both broad and nar-
63 Id. at 321. Cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (limiting habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion in fourth amendment claims).
64 443 U.S. at 321.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 321-22.
11 Id. at 322.
68 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
69 Id. at 323.
71 Id. The court distinguished Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), on the ground that
the right in Jackson, the requirement that the prosecution prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, was central to the basic question of guilt or innocence. 443 U.S. at 323.
71 Id. at 324-26. Justice Stevens, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist,
concurred. They shared the majority's opinion of the evidence but called the new standard
a "gratuitous directive to our colleagues on the federal bench." Id. at 339. The decision,
Stevens argued, was not compelled by the facts of the case or by any "general dissatisfac-
tion with the adequacy of the factfinding process .. " Id. at 328. Nor, he continued, was it
compelled by Winship, which focused on the application of the reasonable doubt standard by
the factfinder, not its enforcement. Id. at 331-35. Finally, he warned of dangers inherent in
the new rule, especially its intrusion on state courts, id. at 336, and the burden it would
impose on federal courts. Id. at 337-39.
72 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
71 See id. at 316. See also Pilon v. Bordenkircher, 444 U.S. 1 (1979) (per curium) (apply-
ing Jackson).
1130 [Vol. 65:1123
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row language,7 4 and focuses only on the application of the
reasonable-doubt standard at trial.7 5 Narrowly read, Winship
holds only that the due process guarantee requires proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile proceedings.7 6  The deci-
sion does not consider the relevance of that guarantee on collat-
eral attack.
7 7
Even read broadly,7 8 Winship does not require habeas corpus
review of allegations of evidentiary insufficiency. Although the
Court assumed otherwise, 79 habeas corpus review of an alleged
infringement of a right is not compelled simply because that right
derives from the Constitution. This principle, dormant for many
years after Brown v. Allen, 8 0 was reestablished in Stone v. Powell,
81
in which the Court held that courts should not review alleged vio-
lations of fourth amendment rights on habeas corpus unless the
state failed to provide the defendant an opportunity for full and
fair review of his claim.
82
The Stone approach to the role of habeas corpus would pro-
tect the defendant's due process rights prescribed by Winship
without incurring many of the problems of Jackson.83 Under
, See notes 76 & 78 infra.
, 397 U.S. at 363-64. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 330-31 & n.3 (concurring
opinion, Stevens, J.).
76 397 U.S. at 359 ("This case presents the single, narrow question whether proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is ... required during the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is
charged with an act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult.") (footnote
omitted).
" See 443 U.S. at 330-31 (concurring opinion, Stevens, J.) ("[N]othing in the Winship
opinion suggests that it also bore on appellate or habeas corpus procedures.").
,1 "Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-
doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to consti-
tute the crime with which he is charged." 397 U.S. at 364 (emphasis added).
" Justice Stewart reasoned that the habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976),
permits claims from prisoners held in violation of the Constitution, and that a conviction
on insufficient evidence violates a constitutional right. He concluded: "[iut follows that such
a claim is cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding." 443 U.S. at 321. For a discus-
sion of the dangers of relying on the statutory language to support broad habeas corpus
review, see text accompanying notes 125-37 infra.
80 344 U.S. 443 (1953). See note 15 supra.
81 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
82 Id. at 481-82.
" Although Stone was a search-and-seizure case, its concern with the cost of habeas
corpus is underscored when due process issues are at stake. The Court frequently stressed
that due process is not absolute, but a relative concept. Courts must strike a balance be-
tween the interests involved and the costs of protective procedures. See, e.g.,; Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) ("'[d]ue process,' unlike some rules, is not a
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances.");
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Stone federal courts would examine only whether the trial court
applied the reasonable doubt standard, 84 and whether the state
provided an adequate opportunity to review the correctness of the
application. 85  A writ would issue if the answers to both inquiries
are negative. Indeed, the Court read Winship this way for seven
years.
8 6
The Jackson Court supplemented its justifications for a new
standard by pointing to the "absurdly unjust results" 8 7 of apply-
ing the no-evidence standard after Winship. In theory, the Court
observed, a defendant convicted by a mere shred of evidence
would be denied habeas review under Thompson, whereas a defen-
dant convicted by overwhelming evidence could get habeas review
if the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury on the standard of
proof.88  Such an anomaly is quite unlikely. The statute 89 re-
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (balancing cost to
litigant and right to notice of suit). But see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156
(1974) (requiring individual notice to all identified members of a FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)
class action).
84 See, e.g., Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100 (1972) (per curiam) (improper jury
instruction).
" Professor Bator, who argues that courts should limit federal habeas corpus review in
most cases, would allow review of the state process. Bator, supra note 10, at 455-60 ("plainly
appropriate" to review "whether the conditions and tools of inquiry were such as to assure a
reasoned probability that the facts were correctly found and the law correctly applied.") (emphasis in
original). Limiting collateral attack to questions of trial court application and adequacy of
state process does not vitiate Winship. But see The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 60, 218 (1979) (standard "inherently unreceivable") [hereinafter cited as 1978 Supreme
Court Term]. This statement ignores the state courts' ability to adjudicate federal claims.
THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (A. Hamilton).
" Freeman first recognized Winship's potential effect on the Thompson standard.
Freeman v. Zahradnick, 429 U.S. at 1111 (1977) (dissent from denial of certiorari, Stewart,
J.). See, e.g., Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478 (1974); Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S.
430 (1973); United States ex rel. Johnson v. Illinois, 469 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 920 (1973); Robinson v. Wolff, 468 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1972) (all applying
Thompson without regard to Winship).
The Court did, however, immediately recognize Winship's significance in areas other
than habeas corpus. See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (no violation of
due process clause to shift burden of proof to defendant when issue not an element of
crime); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (statute requiring defendant to prove
element of crime violates due process clause); Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100 (1972)
(improper jury instruction as to reasonable doubt standard violates due process clause);
Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 (1972) (Winship applied retroactively); Lego v.
Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 486 (1972) (in voluntariness hearing, admissibility of confession
under preponderance standard does not violate due process clause).
17 443 U.S. at 320 n.14.
" Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100 (1972). See 443 U.S. at 320 n.14 ("Such results
would be wholly faithless to the constitutional rationale of Winship.").
89 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c) (1976). See Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886) (origin of
exhaustion doctrine).
1132
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quires the defendant to exhaust state remedies before availing
himself of habeas corpus relief.90 State courts, therefore, will in-
variably examine the sufficiency issue before a federal court con-
siders it on collateral review, and will, in most cases, prevent "ab-
surdly unjust," and other unmeritorious convictions.9' Although
these courts are not infallible, occasional error does not require
such drastic change 92 in the "well established" 93 law of eviden-
tiary review. The Court's decision in Jackson reflects an assump-
tion about the nature of habeas corpus review: that the purpose
of habeas corpus is to seek out errors, however rare, in the de-
termination of guilt.
B. Adequacy of State Process and the Emerging Emphasis on Guilt
Recent Supreme Court decisions suggest two categories of
cognizable claims on writs of habeas corpus. These two categories
reflect different theories about the proper role of habeas corpus
review in the federal system. First, Jackson and Stone v. Powell 94
reflect the Court's emerging view that collateral review should
protect constitutional rights bearing directly on the determination
" See Johnson v. Metz, 609 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1979) (right must be raised at state level
in constitutional form).
1 justice Stevens praised state review in his concurring opinion. "I am aware of no
general dissatisfaction with the accuracy of the factfinding process or the adequacy of the
rules applied by state appellate courts when reviewing claims of insufficiency.... In short,
there is simply no reason to tinker with an elaborate mechanism that is now functioning
well." 443 U.S. at 328-30. Judge Friendly has commented,
[We do not know how many of these [releases of state prisoners on federal
habeas corpus] represented prisoners "whom society has grievously wronged
and for whom belated liberation is little enough compensation," Fay v. Noia,
... or how many were black with guilt. The assumption that many of them fall
in the former category is wholly unsupported.
Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHi. L. REv.
142, 148 n.25 (1970).
92 Jackson's impact on habeas corpus relief is unclear. Courts applying it have been
reluctant to overturn state convictions. See Moore v. Duckworth, 443 U.S. 713 (1979) (per
curiam); Davis v. Campbell, 608 F.2d 317 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Bailey, 607 F.2d
237 (9th Cir. 1979). Analytically, however, Jackson is significant because of it6 new standard
of review and its willingness to discard the most important of the state factual
determinations-guilt or innocence.
9: United States ex rel. Johnson v. Illinois, 469 F.2d 1297, 1300 (7th Cir. 1972) (apply-
ing Thompson as well-settled law, without regard to Winship), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 920
(1973).
94 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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of guilt.95  Second, the Court's decision in Rose v. Mitchell 96 indi-
cates that collateral review should ensure the availability of state
appellate procedures that adequately examine the accuracy and
validity of the guilt-determination process.
97
In Stone, the Court concluded that when examining fourth
amendment claims on collateral attack, interests in efficiency and
federal-state comity outweighed the benefits of the exclusionary
rule.98 A footnote in the opinion, however, reveals the deter-
minative factor in the balance-the notion that habeas corpus
should protect the innocent, not the guilty:
Resort to habeas corpus, especially for purposes other than
to assure that no innocent person suffers an unconstitutional
loss of liberty, results in serious intrusions on values important
to our system of government....
We nevertheless afford broad habeas corpus relief, recog-
nizing the need in a free society for an additional safeguard
against compelling an innocent man to suffer an unconstitu-
tional loss of liberty. 9
The Court's emphasis on innocence presaged a new hierar-
chy of rights in habeas corpus review, in which only those rights
95 See generally Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 18, at 1072-1100. But see Friendly, supra
note 91, at 142 ("with a few important exceptions, convictions should be subject to collat-
eral attack only when the prisoner supplements his constitutional plea with a colorable
claim of innocence.").
96 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
91 See 1978 Supreme Court Term, supra note 85, at 205. The "waiver decisions"-
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (involuntary confession); Francis v. Henderson,
425 U.S. 536 (1976) (unconstitutionally composed grand jury); and Estelle v. Williams, 425
U.S. 501 (1976) (trial in prison clothing)-are difficult to reconcile in the two pronged
standard suggested here. In each case the petitioner failed to raise his claim properly
under the state procedural rules, and in each case the Court rejected federal court review
on writ of habeas corpus. Nevertheless, the claims presented were closely related to the
determination of guilt. See, e.g., Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 18, at 1078-86 (discussing
Henderson and Williams). In addition, Stone is arguably limited to rights related to search-
and-seizure. 428 U.S. at 494-95 n.37. See also Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 560 (1979)
(Stone "made it clear that it was confining its ruling to cases involving the ... exclusionary
rule .... "). Finally, other factors, such as judicial burden, federalism concerns, and weigh-
ing of costs and benefits, appear in some or all of these opinions, while the emphasis on
guilt often appears in footnotes or dicta. Relation to guilt and quality of the state process,
however, is a unifying concern in these cases.
98 428 U.S. at 489-91.
19 Id. at 491 n.31. The footnote concludes, "[B]ut in the case of the typical Fourth
Amendment claim, asserted on collateral attack, a convicted defendant is usually asking
society to redetermine an issue that has no bearing on the basic justice of his incarcera-
tion." Id. For the origins of this view of habeas corpus, see text accompanying notes 6-18
supra. The "serious intrusions in values important to our system of government," are dis-
cussed in text at notes 125-37 infra.
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most related to guilt-determination would be cognizable on habeas
corpus. 100
With its decision in Jackson, the Court firmly established this
hierarchy. In distinguishing Stone, the Court stated,
The constitutional issue presented in this case is far differ-
ent from the kind of issue that was the subject of the Court's
decision in Stone .... The question whether a defendant has
been convicted upon inadequate evidence is central to the basic
question of guilt or innocence. 10'
The true significance of Jackson, therefore, does not lie simply in
the Court's expansion of the no-evidence standard to comport
with Winship. More than the logical corollary to Winship, Jackson
confirms the Court's emerging view that habeas corpus relief
should protect constitutional claims directly concerning the pro-
cess of guilt-determination.
The Court has not limited collateral review, however, to
guilt-related claims. In Stone, the Court recognized the importance
of "an opportunity for full and fair" review at the state level.' 0 2 In
Rose v. Mitchell,10 3 the Court authorized collateral review of al-
leged discrimination in the selection of grand jurors, holding that
when the defendant "claims that the state judiciary itself has ...
violated" the Constitution "[a] federal forum must be available if a
full and fair hearing of such claims is to be had." 104
III
THREE APPROACHES TO HABEAS CORPUS
The Supreme Court at different times has held two different
views of the role of habeas corpus. The first, the basis of Brown
100 Commentators and judges immediately predicted Stone's potential effect on other
rights, both guilt-related and nonguilt-related. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 515-19
(1976) (dissenting opinion, Brennan, J.); Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 18, at 1086-1100;
1978 Supreme Court Term, supra note 85, at 219. Some anticipated Jackson, having viewed
Stone as broadening habeas corpus to include evidentiary sufficiency claims, while closing
collateral review to rights only tangentially related to guilt. See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra
note 18, at 1086-88, 1097-100.
101 443 U.S. at 323 (emphasis added). Stone could have been distinguished simply by
limiting it to the exclusionary rule. The Court suggested this distinction in Stone itself. See
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n.37 (1976); note 105 infra.
102 428 U.S. at 494.
103 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
IQ' Id. at 561. The Rose Court limited collateral review of nonguilt-related claims to in-
stances where the state judiciary itself is the alleged perpetrator of the constitutional viola-
tions. Stone is in harmony if confined to authorize state court review of police conduct.
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and Fay, is that habeas corpus should be available to review all
constitutional violations. Ironically, this plenary view has not en-
tirely disappeared; a crucial link in Justice Stewart's reasoning in
Jackson is that because Jackson had "stated a federal constitutional
claim," "such a claim is cognizable in a federal habeas corpus pro-
ceeding." 105 The second view, underlying Jackson and Stone, is
that habeas corpus should be available to review only violations of
rights related to the guilt determination. Both approaches are un-
satisfactory; this Note, therefore, proposes a third.
A. Plenary Review
The Vinson and Warren Courts allowed plenary review of
constitutional claims on habeas corpus.o'3 As Jackson and Stone
demonstrate, however, the Court in recent years has, appro-
priately, abandoned this view.
The Court had justified plenary review on the "expansive
language," "mandatory tone," and "historical context" of the
habeas corpus statute.1 0 7  Indeed, the broad language of the orig-
inal statute did seem to authorize collateral review of all alleged
constitutional violations:
[The Federal courts], in addition to the authority already con-
ferred by law, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus
in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her
liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of
the United States .... 108
105 443 U.S. at 321.
106 See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (alleged coerced confession examined on
collateral review although petitioner failed to appeal at state level); Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443 (1953) (alleged discrimination in jury selection examined on habeas corpus even
though claim fully heard at state level). Cf Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 11-12
(statute prohibiting second habeas petition only bars petition for identical claim).
Plenary review forms the basis for many criticisms of Burger Court decisions limiting
habeas corpus. See dissenting opinions of Justices Brennan and White in Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 536-37, 543 (1976); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 543 (1976) (dissent-
ing opinion, Brennan, J.); 1978 Supreme Court Term, supra note 85, at 206-09; Comment,
Federal Habeas Corpus: The Relevance of Petitioner's Innocence, 46 U. Mo. K.C. L. REV. 382
(1978).'
107 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976). Congress originally enacted the statute in 1867. Act of Feb.
5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. Language changes resulting from codification in the
United States Code were intended only to consolidate the various habeas corpus statutes,
not to change the import of the Act. Note, The Freedom Writ-The Expanding Use of Federal
Habeas Corpus, 61 HARV. L. REv. 657, 659 n.22 (1948).
"I Act of Feb..5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
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Viewing this language against "the background of post-Civil War
efforts in Congress to deal severely with the States of the former
Confederacy," 109 Justice Brennan in Fay v. Noia110 reached the
"inescapable"l conclusion that Congress intended the statute to
protect all constitutional rights. According to Fay, Congress in-
tended the statute to give federal courts the broadest possible
power to enforce the many rights that it was about to create by
the Reconstruction Act and the fourteenth amendment.'
1 2
Some scholars, however, do not regard this conclusion as in-
escapable.11 3 Professor Lewis Mayers concludes that Congress
did not intend the 1867 Act to apply to state prisoners at all, ar-
guing that it was a poorly drafted law intended only to release
legally-freed blacks who were still enslaved.' 14  Mayers claims the
sparse congressional debates on the Act fail to support Justice
Brennan's interpretation 115 and argues that Congress passed the
Act with neither the Reconstruction Acts 116 nor the fourteenth
amendment 117 in mind. Contemporary courts did not believe that
the 1867 Act increased the number of issues cognizable on collat-
eral review, and courts did not abandon the traditional require-
ment that the petitioner allege "jurisdictional error" 118 until
1942.119
The Fay Court also stated that the 1867 Act empowered
courts to review all rights because it codified the common law writ
of habeas corpus.1 20  The Court asserted that the purpose of the
common law writ was to redress any governmental restraint in
violation of fundamental law.' 2 1  Professor Dallin Oaks, however,
109 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 415 (1963).
1,0 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
"I Id. at 415.
112 Id. at 415-16.
"' Bator, supra note 10, at 474-77; Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme
Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 31 (1965). But see 1978 Supreme Court Term,
supra note 85, at 106; Comment, supra note 106, at 399-415.
14 Mayers, supra note 113, at 35. Today, however, the statute's application to state pris-
oners is unquestioned. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 475 (1976); Bator, supra note 10,
at 465.
' Mayers, supra note 113, at 33-43. See also Bator, supra note 10, at 475-77.
226 Mayers, supra note 113, at 48-52.
i Id. at 52-55.
118 See notes 11-13 and accompanying text supra.
229 Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942). See Bator, supra note 1.0, at 478-83; Develop-
ments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 6, at 1049-50.
120 372 U.S. at 402-05.
121 Id.
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rejects the Court's argument: "[The] broad license to 'remedy any
kind of governmental restraint contrary to fundamental law'
originates in the United States Reports, not the annals of English
history." 122
Clearly, then, the statute was not intended to authorize plen-
ary review. Nor has Congress shown any such intent since the Act
was passed. It has never clarified the scope of the writ, 123 despite
widely varying judicial constructions.
1 24
Finally, policy considerations militate against plenary review.
Plenary review impairs judicial efficiency, strains federal-state
comity, and undermines the finality of state court judgments. As
the Court expands the scope of the due process clause, the
number bf habeas corpus claims increases. 125  This poses two
problems. First, it contributes to the already overloaded dockets of
the federal courts. The volume of habeas petitions filed by state
prisoners in the district courts swelled from 541 in 1953 126 to
over 18,000 in 1979.127 Although few petitions require retrial or
even a hearing, I28 each petition requires at least a few hours of
careful scrutiny, lest the occasional deserving petition be over-
looked. I' Habeas review also unnecessarily duplicates the use of
judicial resources. 30  There is no reason to presume that the sec-
122 Oaks, supra note 6, at 466 (quoting-Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 405) (footnote omitted).
See generally id. at 458-68. Professor Oaks restricted his objection to the Court's use of
history; he did not criticize the Court's conclusion. Id. at 453, 457, 471-72.
123 But see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 522 (1976) (dissenting opinion, Brennan, J.);
Mayers, supra note 113, at 32 (both arguing congressional silence indicated approval of the
"expansive," reading of the statute). For a review of bills that were intended to affect
habeas corpus jurisdiction but were not enacted, see Mayers, supra note 113, at 32 n.6;
Note, Relieving the Habeas Corpus Burden: A Jurisdictional Remedy, 63 IOWA L. REV. 392,
403-05 (1977).
124 Compare Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1963) (statute prohibiting sec-
ond habeas petition for similar relief bars only petitions for identical claim) and Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), with Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) and Francis v.
Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976) and Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
125 See Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929
(1965) (reprinted with alterations in H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 235 (1967)).
126 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 536 n.8 (1953) (concurring opinion, Jackson, J.).
127 [1979] ADMIN. OFFICE OF UNITED STATES COURTS ANN. REP. 61. See generally id. at
48, 59-62.
128 See Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 6, at 1041-42; Com-
ment, supra note 106, at 416-17.
129 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (concurring opinion, Jackson, J.) ("He
who must search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the
needle is not worth the search."); Friendly, supra note 91, at 147-49.
130 Judge Friendly argues:
Indeed, the most serious single evil with today's proliferation of collateral attack
is its drain upon the resources of the community-judges, prosecutors, and
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ond tribunal is more competent than the first, especially in mat-
ters of evidence and fact-finding.
13 '
Plenary review severely impairs federal-state comity. 132  By
expanding due process requirements, courts inflate many routine
findings of fact into constitutional issues cognizable on collateral
review.1 33  Plenary review can also chill the relationship between
state and federal courts; the knowledge that any conviction can be
attacked collaterally may engender insecurity and resentment in
state court judges.
134
Finally, excessive use of habeas corpus greatly impinges on
the finality of state trials. 135  It promotes seemingly endless litiga-
tion of insignificant evidentiary questions,1 36 and thereby under-
mines public confidence in the criminal justice system and its de-
terrent function.
t37
Of course, habeas corpus should not be eliminated.138  In
some circumstaces, the writ is proper and necessary.1 39 However,
the Court's assumption in Fay and perhaps even in Jackson-that
attorneys appointed to aid the accused, and even of that oft overlooked neces-
sity, courtrooms. Today of all times we should be conscious of the falsity of the
bland assumption that these are in endless supply.
Friendly, supra note 91, at 148 (footnote omitted). See also Bator, supra note 10, at 451.
"I' See Bator, supra note 10, at 509-10.
112 The arguments in this paragraph rely heavily on the excellent articles by Professor
Bator, supra note 10, and Judge Friendly, supra note 91. See also Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S.
545, 583-85 (1979) (concurring opinion, Powell, J.) and Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491
n.31 (1976).
133 See Friendly, supra note 125, at 929.
134 1 could imagine nothing more subversive of a judge's sense of responsibility, of
the inner subjective conscientiousness which is so essential a part of the dif-
ficult and subtle art of judging well, than an indiscriminate acceptance of the
notion that all the shots will be always be called by someone else.
Bator, supra note 10, at 451.
15 It is a point difficult to formulate because so easily twisted into an expression
of mere complacency.... Somehow, somewhere, we must accept the fact that
human institutions are short of infallible; there is reason for a policy which
leaves well enough alone and which channels our limited resources of concern
toward more productive ends.
Bator, supra note 10, at 452-53. But see Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners:
An Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. R-v. 423 (1961) (broad habeas corpus encourages
states to improve post-conviction remedies); Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 18, at 1045-46
(duplication reduces possibility of error and encourages states to improve their methods of
review).
"16 See Friendly, supra note 91, at 147.
137 See Bator, supra note 10, at 452.
13' Indeed, the Constitution forbids total elimination of the remedy. U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 9, cl. 2.
139 See text accompanying notes 139-41 and 180-91 infra.
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habeas corpus should be available to hear all constitutional
violations-is clearly inappropriate.
B. Quality of State Process and Relevance to Guilt
The Burger Court, however, appears to have rejected plen-
ary habeas corpus review. Instead, it has fashioned a two-pronged
analysis based upon the relationship of the right to the determina-
tion of guilt, and the adequacy of state review processes. Only the
latter withstands close scrutiny.
Federal collateral review of the adequacy of state processes is
both desirable and necessary. No strong state policies support
withholding review. For example, although courts are properly re-
luctant to intrude on state adjudications, if the state has not given
the case sufficient consideration,1 40 collateral review constitutes no
intrusion. Similarly, if the state fails to provide the defendant with
an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional claims, federal re-
view is neither inefficient nor duplicative. A defendant's constitu-
tional rights demand protection by adequate judicial process, be it
state or federal. At a minimum habeas corpus must be available
for all claims of constitutional violations that fail to receive a fair
hearing by a state court.
1 41
The second basis of review-the guilt-relatedness of the
right-suffers from three flaws: historical inaccuracy, internal
conflict, and conceptual shortsightedness.
Proponents of this approach claim the historical function of
habeas corpus is to free the unjustly imprisoned, the innocent.1 42
But this analysis is, as Professor Mayers said in a similar context,
"an illustration of the way in which an undocumented and seem-
ingly ill-founded historical assertion can, by dint of repetition,
gain acceptance even by the Supreme Court." 1
43
40 See, e.g., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90-91 (1923); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S.
545 (1979); note 104 supra.
4' See Bator, supra note 10, at 455. The Court might question not only whether the
opportunity for review is actually denied, but also whether the violation claimed is unlikely
to receive fair review at the state level. An example of the latier is where the violation was
by the state court system itself, as with domination of a trial by organized crime, see Bator,
supra note 10, at 483-93 (comparing Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) with Frank v.
Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915)) or discrimination in grand jury selection, see Rose v. Mitch-
ell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
142 Justice Powell, for example, is a proponent of this view. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 491 n.31 (1976); Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 303 (1975) (dissenting opinion,
Powell, J.); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 258 (1973) (concurring opinion,
Powell, J.). See also Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 18, at 1086.
143 Mayers, supra note 113, at 32.
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Justice Powell, the author of the Stone opinion, is the
strongest advocate of this view of habeas corpus. 4 4 To support
his position, 145 he relies on a well-known article by Judge
Friendly, 14 6 and Justice Black's dissent in Kaufman v. United
States.1 47  Judge Friendly's article, however, does not adequately
support Justice Powell's historical analysis, 148 and the support it
does provide also relies on the Kaufman dissent.' 49  In that dis-
sent, Justice Black claimed that "the great historic role of the writ
of habeas corpus has been to insure the reliability of the guilt-
determining process." 150 For support, Justice Black cited Profes-
sor Mishkin, 15' who in turn relied upon the broad language of
Fay v. Noia.1
52
But Fay's account of the historical role of habeas corpus is
inaccurate.153  Indeed, early cases almost uniformly indicate that
the Court regarded the writ not as a tool to correct erroneous de-
terminations of guilt, 5 4 but rather as one to redress procedurally in-
firm convictions. Indeed, this theory provided the basis for the
long reigning 'jurisdictional error" limitation. 155
144 See note 142 supra.
14. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 n.31 (1976); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 258 (1973).
146 Friendly, supra note 91.
147 394 U.S. 217, 231 (1969) (search and seizure claims of federal prisoners cognizable
on habeas corpus).
148 See note 38 supra.
149 Friendly, supra note 91, at 142.
150 394 U.S. at 234. This formulation differs from Justice Powell's; the reasonable doubt
standard, for example, protects the innocent but does not always improve the accuracy of
the criminal process. See generally In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
151 Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term-Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ, and
the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARv. L. REV. 56 (1965).
152 Id. at 79. The language in Fay is so broad that it provides authority for all positions.
See 372 U.S. at 400-02. The Court even cited the decision to support the curtailment of
habeas corpus in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 n.31 (1976).
153 Bator, supra note 10, at 465-83; Mayers, supra note 113; Oaks, supra note 6. See text
accompanying notes 113-24 supra.
154 See, e.g., Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830) (Court would not review claim
of improper indictment); Ex parte Kearney, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 38 (1822) (Court refused to
review claim where prisoner convicted of contempt refused to answer incriminating ques-
tions at trial). The modern cases applying the exclusionary rule on habeas are notable. See
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969). Justice Harlan's dissent in Fay reflects the
role that guilt plays in Warren Court habeas decisions:
Whether or not Noia itas guilty of the crime of felony murder, and whether
the evidence of his guilt was accurate and substantial, are matters irrelevant to
the question of coercion [of Noia's confession] and also irrelevant here.
372 U.S. at 472 n.26.
155 See text accompanying notes 11-15 supra.
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The guilt or innocence distinction also poses serious analyti-
cal problems. Jackson suggests that the concept of guilt may be
interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, the Court seemed to
focus on flaws in the process of guilt determination, rather than
the effects of those flaws on the decision of the fact-finder.' 56 On
the other hand, the Court's rationale often revealed a desire to
redress only those determinations that are actually mistaken.
1 57
The two concepts can conflict. If the prisoner alleges that his con-
viction is invalid because of a violation of a right that is directly
related to the guilt determination process, but the conviction
clearly appears to be correct,1 58 the court is faced with two un-
satisfactory choices. If it denies the writ, the function of collateral
review becomes transformed into a harmless error standard.
Courts will review violations of rights that bear upon the determi-
nation of guilt, but will not grant habeas relief if the conviction is
otherwise valid.' 9 This limitation is at odds with thorough re-
view of alleged violations of guilt-related rights. On the other
hand, if the court issues a writ, 6 ° the primary goal of habeas re-
view under this view-insuring the correct adjudication of crimi-
nal cases-is lost, and a guilty defendant freed.
16 1
More important, this view of habeas corpus relief improperly
balances the interests of state and federal courts. States have a
strong interest in the accurate determination of guilt. Public out-
rage over an erroneous outcome, 62 the cost of supporting a pris-
oner who is unjustly incarcerated, and the danger to society pre-
See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 323:
The question whether a defendant has been convicted upon inadequate evi-
dence is central to the basic question of guilt or innocence. The constitutional
necessity of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not confined to those defen-
dants who are morally blameless.
'57 See id. at 320 n. 14 (concern for hypothetically incorrect results under Thompson
standard).
158 The Supreme Court faced this problem twice in 1977, reaching different conclu-
sions. Compare Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) (suggestive identification proce-
dure) with Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (denial of effective counsel).
"I Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114-17 (1977) (holding due process clause did
not compel the exclusion of identification evidence in part because the likelihood of mis-
identification was minor).
160 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (defendant who located victim's body freed
on writ of habeas corpus because of denial of constitutional right to counsel).
161 In many cases, the court will condition the writ to allow the state to retry the defen-
dant within a limited time. However, successful retrial may only be a theoretical possibility.
Friendly, supra note 91, at 147.
6' An outcome is "erroneous" when an innocent defendant is adjudged guilty, or a
guilty defendant adjudged innocent when he is in fact guilty. Such statements, of course,
must be used with caution.
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sented by erroneously released prisoners provide states with
strong incentives to insure proper guilt determinations. Even if
correct determinations are required by the due process clause,'
16 3
the states can be expected to achieve this goal as well as the fed-
eral courts, because the states have an equally strong interest in
accuracy.
164
Of course, district court judges will not completely ignore
considerations of guilt or innocence. But a conscious distinction
between constitutional rights based on their relation to the deter-
mination of guilt or innocence is inappropriate. Although it may
present interesting possibilities for development,"6 5 and is predict-
able, the distinction is historically unjustified, internally conflict-
ing, and unrelated to the real needs habeas corpus must serve.
C. A Federalism Approach
Habeas corpus review should not be plenary, nor based on
the guilt-relatedness of the asserted" right. Instead, courts should
limit collateral review to alleged violations of constitutional in-
terests most in need of federal protection. These fall into two
categories. First, habeas corpus relief should be available to pris-
oners who allege violations of rights that are in special danger of
inadequate protection in state courts.' 66  Usually this danger is
greatest for federal rights that may interfere with the state's in-
terest in accurately determining guilt or innocence.1 6 7  Second,
163 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("[T]he Due Process Clause protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.").
164 See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 328 (1979) (concurring opinion, Stevens, J.)
("[I] am aware of no general dissatisfaction with the accuracy of the factfinding process");
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (concurring opinion, Jackson, J.) ("It must prej-
udice the occasional meritorious application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones.");
Friendly, supra note 91, at 147-48.
This is not to deny that an occasional defendant falls victim to a "conviction of pas-
sion," the utterly unfounded pronouncement of guilt. But even this unjustice does not
justify shifting the focus of habeas corpus to the problem-ridden area of guilt-related
rights. They can be dealt with in other ways-some by habeas review; in many such cases
rights are violated that should be reviewed on habeas. See text accompanying notes 185-89
infra. Others can be remedied by executive clemency. But if habeas corpus must be re-
stricted, there are rights which need more protection than those related to guilt.
165 See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 18, at 1086-1100.
166 See 1978 Supreme Court Term, supra note 85, at 207-09; Developments in the Law-
Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 6, at 1059-61.
167 When enforcement of the right interposes an obstacle to correctness, as in fourth
amendment cases, the state's interest in protecting it is not as strong. Even when state
judges try to avoid this conflict, their active role in the trial endangers these constitutional
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the writ should be available to prisoners who allege that the state
did not provide an opportunity for meaningful state review of
their claims.
An analysis of federal and state interests will identify those
rights appropriate for federal review. For example, federal rights
that lack state counterparts or directly affect intergovernmentdl
relationships 168 require special attention by the federal
judiciary. 169  Even when state review is as full and fair as possible,
these rights require review in federal court. 170  Habeas corpus
fills this need.
171
Conversely, if states have strong interests in preserving fed-
eral rights, federal review of alleged violations is unnecessary.
Such rights include those that comport with the state interest in
correct adjudication. Likewise, where a state's interest in its own
processes is much stronger than federal interests in overseeing en-
forcement of a right, federal review is improper.1 72  These con-
questions. Justice Schaefer of the Supreme Court of Illinois has said that "even though
those requirements come with the ultimate sanction of a constitutional command, I can
testify that it is not always easy to focus upon the procedural requirement and shut out
considerations of guilt or innocence." Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70
HARV. L. REV. 1, 13 (1956). This is especially true where there is clear evidence of guilt.
168 See Fasano v. Hall, 615 F.2d 555 (1st Cir. 1980) (state conviction allegedly violated
Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act); Petition of Carmen, 165 F. Supp. 942 (N.D. Cal.
1958) (exclusive federal jurisdiction under Ten Major Crimes Act).
169 Federal judges frequently face these issues and escape parochial pressures and con-
cerns, such as reelection politics.
170 Cf Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657-58 (1961) (questioning states' willingness to
enforce unpopular federal constitutional requirements).
171 See United States ex rel. Radich v. Criminal Ct., 459 F.2d 745, 748 (2d Cir. 1972)
("The writ's objective ... is to assure that when a person is detained unlawfully or in
violation of his constitutional rights he will be afforded an independent determination by a
federal court .. ., even though the issue may already have been decided on the merits by a
state tribunal."), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1115 (1973). This conception of the writ's main pur-
pose survived Stone v. Powell. In 1977, the Supreme Court approved the issuance of a writ
to a man who had undeniably murdered a young girl but had been tricked into incriminat-
ing himself in the absence of counsel. The Court concluded:
Although we do not lightly affirm the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in
this case, so clear a violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments as here
occurred cannot be condoned. The pressure on state executive and judicial of-
ficers charged with the administration of the criminal law are great, especially
when the crime is murder and the victim a small child. But it is precisely the
predictability of those pressures that makes imperative a resolute loyalty to the guarantees
that the Constitution extends to us all.
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 406 (1977) (emphasis added). See also 1978 Supreme Court
Term, supra note 85, at 209; Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 6, at
1059-61.
172 Most would agree, for example, the federal interest in preserving the right to bear
arms is weaker than the state's interest in controlling possession of weapons.
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siderations provide a useful framework for analyzing specific
rights.
Under this "federalism" approach, both Stone173 and
Jackson 1 4 would be resolved differently. Because strict enforce-
ment of the exclusionary rule 17 5 often allows "[t]he criminal ...
to go free because the constable [had] blundered," 176 it conflicts
with the state's interest in punishing the guilty.' 7 7 Indeed, state-
determinations of exclusionary rule claims may often be in-
adequate because the rule can negate a correct determination of
guilt. 17 8 Habeas corpus, therefore, must be available to protect
this right, and any other 1 79 that tends to impair the guilt or inno-
cence determination at the state level.
Those rights compatible with state interests will be adequately
protected by state courts, and do not require federal review.
Evidentiary sufficiency is a good example. Here federal review
strikes at the very purpose of-the state criminal trial-a correct
outcome.18 0  Further, although after Jackson sufficiency claims
are of constitutional dimension, state courts have an equally
strong interest in such claims. For example, state courts apply a
test similar to that suggested by the Jackson court 181 when review-
ing directed verdicts and judgments not withstanding the ver-
dict.'8 2  Charges of invalid identification techniques and claims
173 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (fourth amendment claims not cognizable on
habeas where opportunity for full and fair state review was provided).
174 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (evidentiary sufficiency claims cognizable on
habeas).
17' See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961) overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
171 People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
177 See notes 162-64 and accompanying text supra.
18 See text accompanying note 167 supra.
179 Such rights might include, for example, Miranda warnings, see Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966), and coerced confessions. See Achcraft v. Tennessee, 332 U.S.
143 (1944) (confession obtained after 36 hours of continuous interrogation); Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (confessions obtained after five days of prolonged interroga-
tions); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (confessions obtained through use of
extreme physical force).
I8o Post-Jackson experience confirms this: federal courts only reluctantly overturn state
court sufficiency findings. See, e.g., Moore v. Duckworth, 443 U.S. 713, 714 (1979) (approv-
ing district court refusal to issue writ); Jacobs v. Redman, 616 F.2d 1251 (3d Cir. 1980)
(conditionally approving district court refusal to issue writ); Davis v. Campbell, 608 F.2d
317 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); United States v. Bailey, 607 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1979).
181 "[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential ele-
ments of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 443 U.S. at 319 (emphasis in original).
182 See, e.g., Teller v. Anchorage Asphalt Paving Co., Inc., 545 P.2d 177, 180 (Alaska
1976); Williams v. Dade County, 237 So. 2d 776, 777 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Dan Hayes
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that a prisoner's conviction was based upon hearsay or perjured
testimony should also be limited to state review.18 3 These allega-
tions involve the reliability of the evidence, which affects the accu-
rate determination of guilt or innocence-the heart of the state
interest.
18 4
This suggested federalism approach is superior to both plen-
ary review and a guilt-relatedness standard. It will not excessively
impinge upon state tribunals. Indeed, the approach guarantees
the protection of state interests because they are components of
the test itself. And, finally, it meshes well with the proper role of
habeas corpus in the federal-state relationship.
Habeas corpus review would often remain available to re-
dress the "absurdly unjust" 185 cases. First, the federal court may
review the trial proceedings to insure that the state court applies
the reasonable doubt standard. 86 As Justice Stevens points out
in his concurring opinion in Jackson, the required application is
more than a "trial ritual." 187 Second, the federal court may
examine the process for state court review of the right. To sur-
vive, the state review procedure must be meaningful, considered,
and thorough.
88
Boiler & Repair Co. v. Illinois Masonic Medical Center, 30 Il1. App. 3d 616, 620, 332 N.E.
2d 463, 466 (1975).
,83 Several commentators favor the Jackson and Stone treatment of these rights. See
Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 18, at 1091-95; Note, The Search for a New Equilibrium in
Habeas Corpus Review: Resolution of Conflicting Values, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 637, 660-64
(1978).
184 Other rights are more problematic, and this Note will not attempt to treat them all.
The strongly competing interests involved in the right to a jury trial, for example, have
already divided the Supreme Court, which has balanced these interests by requiring a
minimum on the number of jurors and degree of unanimity. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406
U.S. 404, 410-12 (1972) (sanctioning nonunanimous jury); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78
(1970) (sanctioning six man jury). But cf. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (prohibit-
ing five man jury). On the other hand, federal courts should hear claims that state proc-
esses allegedly transgress federal but not constitutional law. State courts are reluctant to
undertake this often difficult and technical review. See In re Carmen, 165 F. Supp. 942
(N.D. Cal. 1958) (violation of Ten Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1151-54 (1976)), aff'd per
curiam, 270 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 934 (1960); but see Fasano v.
Hall, 615 F.2d 555, 557 (1st Cir. 1980) (federal court would not review violation of In-
terstate Agreement on Detainers Act, 18 U.S.C. App. § 2 (1976), because it was not a
"fundamental defect which inherently result[ed] in a complete miscarriage of justice.")
(quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974)).
1'5 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 320 n.14.
'88 See Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100 (1972) (per curium) (reasonable doubt stan-
dard improperly applied).
,87 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 333 n.7 (1979).
188 The court must be careful, of course, to avoid applying the Jackson standard itself
when reviewing its use below.
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The Court in Jackson, then, should not have reviewed the
evidence directly. Instead, it should have carefully examined the
Virginia proceedings. If it had found that the trial court had
applied the reasonable doubt standard and that the state provided
adequate review under a correct standard of the sufficiency ques-
tion, the Court should have affirmed the state court under
Thompson v. City of Louisville. 
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CONCLUSION
In recent years, the Supreme Court's delineation of rights
that are cognizable on habeas corpus review has been confused
and unprincipled. Two concerns- adequacy of state review and
protection of rights that affect the guilt or innocence
determination -dominate the Court's approach. Although its at-
tempt to limit the scope of habeas corpus is laudable, and its em-
phasis on adequate state review necessary, the Court's distinction
between rights based on their relation to guilt does little for the
integrity of the habeas remedy. An approach based on federalism
concerns would limit, clarify, and strengthen the doctrine of
habeas corpus.
Anne Willis Reed
If an unjust case were to survive all this review-a "conviction of passion" with no
federal violations of any kind-it would seems that executive clemency would be the
proper remedy. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 168 (1976); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
476 (1963) (dissenting opinion, Harlan, J.) ("I recognize that Noia's predicament may well
be thought one that strongly calls for correction. But the proper course to that end lies
with the New York Governor's powers of executive clemency, not with the federal courts.")
,s9 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
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